

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Bill —

Returning these with thanks.
It still seems to me your
concerns are primarily in operations
and state of art on Counterinsurgency
intel rather than on substantive data
sought by Gen. K. Naturally we should
be concerned with both,
but more with latter. ©

5 July 1962
(DATE)


FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(RAY CLINE)

(47)

(USIB - D - 63.6/2 attached)

COUNTER-INSURGENCY INTELLIGENCE



SECRET

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26 June 1962

Bill

*copy, [unclear] [unclear] of
this to FE/DDP to see what
they think of this approach vis-a-vis
South Vietnam et al.*

COUNTER INSURGENCY INTELLIGENCE

1. The various writers on guerrilla warfare are almost unanimous in pointing out the essential nature of good intelligence. This lesson is emphasized particularly when the writings discuss counter insurgency situations. In spite of this almost universal emphasis on the importance of intelligence and in spite of the number of situations that have occurred during the past 20 years in which counter insurgency campaigns have been launched, there is no single case that can be pointed to as a model in which all techniques of intelligence have been combined to provide the quality and volume of intelligence support modern intelligence is theoretically capable of providing to action officers. In the absence of such an ideal case history to be used for the guidance of future counter insurgency intelligence operations, it would appear appropriate for us to construct a model of the intelligence techniques that should be applied to the counter insurgency problem and the way in which they should be organized. This will be a theoretical model in the sense that it will not discuss the department or agency that should be responsible for various aspects

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of the problem. In practice, of course, this can be a very real problem. Also in practice, it might be desirable for an allied nation to provide some of the intelligence functions described below. The purpose of this model, however, is to discuss intelligence techniques and their application to the counter insurgency problem.

2. The first essential is that there should be an element at each level of command or action in the counter insurgency problem that is capable of analyzing the intelligence pertaining to the problems of that level and with the authority to levy requirements for the collection of the information that it needs to support its analysis. Counter insurgency operations must be aimed at the grass roots of the country involved and must be fast moving operations. This means that adequate intelligence support must provide a large volume of information rapidly. This information will involve terrain, personalities, local customs, local political and economic issues, etc. These problems must be understood in the upper levels of the counter insurgency operation and at the Washington level, but they must be dealt with in a timely manner at the local level and it is therefore as near the local level as possible that the bulk of this intelligence analysis should be performed.

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3. At this point it should be clearly understood by all concerned that the provision of adequate intelligence in support of counter insurgency operations is an expensive business. It takes almost as many people to produce proper intelligence on a small country as it does to produce the same kind of intelligence on a large country. The thing that creates the requirement for large numbers of people is not the size of the area involved but rather the intimacy of detail that is required by successful counter insurgency operations.

4. Once the apparatus has been constructed for the analysis of intelligence, this apparatus must be fed by the following systems:

a. An overt network of observers must be established as widely as possible, and these observers must be furnished with adequate communications. A large part of the problem in counter insurgency operations is involved in just knowing what is happening. The overt observer net fills this need. In addition, a great deal of information will find its way in if there is somebody to receive it. The overt observers can provide a channel for those people who wish to volunteer information. The overt observers can also receive requirements and can carry out open interviews and interrogations.

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b. The second requirement is for good liaison contact with local intelligence and police services. Such contact is essential because these services can provide a wide range of information that cannot be collected easily by any other means (prisoner interrogations, wire tapping, etc.) or in those cases where the local service is inefficient or otherwise uncooperative, it is important to know as much as possible about the operations of the service in order to assess the impact of its operations on the policy of the local government.

c. Counter insurgency operations also require the support of information collected by a clandestine net. Such a net should be extensive and should be aimed at the penetration of small communities over a wide range of country. Such an operation should be supported by a large-scale operation for the accumulation of personality files. Since people are the main target of both guerrilla and counter insurgency forces, data on personalities will be an essential element in many aspects of the operation.

d. In addition to the large scale clandestine net described above, there should be an aggressive counter intelligence operation aimed at the penetration of the guerrilla force and Communist Party apparatus. Here again the personality files will be of tremendous value.

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e. There should be a collection of appropriately qualified linguists reading the local press for necessary factual information, personality data and propaganda themes. Local radio broadcasts should also be monitored for the same purposes.

f. A Special Intelligence operation should be organized in direct support of the counter insurgency forces. This operation should be sufficiently large to cover all existing targets in the area and should feed its results directly into the analytical element working at the local action level, even though its material may also be forwarded to higher echelons. This means that enough cleared linguists and technicians should be made available at the local level to make it possible to process as much material as possible on the spot.

g. A photo reconnaissance capability is essential and this must be supported by laboratory facilities and photo interpretation teams to make it possible for aerial reconnaissance to provide timely tactical information in support of operations.

h. It is obvious from a casual glance at the foregoing list of intelligence operations that the requirement for rapid and secure communications will be tremendous. It will be necessary

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to tie together widely scattered facilities in countries where indigenous communications are rudimentary.

1. The security requirements in such a complex of operations will also be quite high. This burden will be particularly heavy on polygraph operators and other persons needed in the handling of large numbers of people.

5. Some of the jobs outlined above can sometimes be done by existing facilities, but this is not always the case, and it should always be recognized that existing facilities are already employed on tasks that must continue to compete with the counter insurgency problem. Another problem that should be recognized is that created by the existence of security compartments. Such artificial barriers are often difficult to overcome but they cause a tremendous decrease in the efficiency of the intelligence support if they are allowed to exist unnecessarily. There must be an adequate intelligence analysis element which receives and can combine the results of all collection systems and apply these results in a meaningful manner to operations currently in progress.

6. If the above system for the provision of counter insurgency intelligence is established properly at the local level, it can provide as a direct by-product of its work most of the information

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that would be needed by higher headquarters in connection with the intelligence that must be produced to support decisions at those levels. Higher echelons must also support the local counter insurgency operation, because on occasion the higher echelon is the only place where certain types of analysis can be performed. Each higher echelon should keep this support role constantly in mind and see that responsibility is fixed so that somebody is always looking after the interests of the lower echelon.

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